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Abstract 
Launched with considerable fanfare in 1969, the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 
(CCMS) was supposed to bring new life to NATO by both re-energising public support and engaging 
with a variety of themes, issues and partners well beyond the alliance’s traditional scope. The first aim 
of this article is to go beyond the careful media operation that surrounded the launch of the CCMS and 
to examine the scepticism and resistance of some European partners, particularly the British. The 
second aim is to demonstrate that NATO started to think in terms of crisis management, disaster relief 
and environmental disasters well before 1989. The sheer military strength of the alliance and of its 
partners did remain central – and notably came back to the forefront in 1979 – but the alliance did start 
to see itself as a geopolitical player and to consider engagement beyond its strictly defined geographical 
area as early as 1969.  
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Science and technology have always played (?) an important role in NATO’s strategic concept and 
defence planning. During the Cold War, it was essential to keep the edge in scientific and technological 
research and to make sure that the West could compete with the Soviet Bloc. At the same time, 
cooperation in scientific and technological development was an important factor for the cohesion of the 
alliance itself. Since the 1960s, many member governments became concerned about the increasing gap 
between the scientific and technological achievements of the United States and of Western Europeans, 
who lagged behind. The problem became more serious in the 1970s, when the balance of payments 
between the two sides of the Atlantic was affected by patent costs.1 This was also the time when student 
and worker movements brought about a new wave of protests against the establishment, the older 
generation of politicians and the logic of the Cold War as a whole. The political discourse saw the 
emerging of new ideas, including the beginning of a new environmental awareness. The peace and 
environmental movements gained considerable momentum and became important political actors. 
Contrary to the previous decade, the peace movements were separated from international communism, 
and in fact they were quite critical of the communist regimes as much as the Western governments for 
their lack of commitment to peace and international dialogue and for the economic, political and 
environmental consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2  The new political and 
environmental consciousness directly affected NATO, which was seen as responsible for perpetrating 
the logic of the Cold War and for being unaware of the concerns faced by its younger generations. 
Support for the alliance was dwindling fast. 
Gone were the days of a clear vision of the world in black and white in which NATO had simply 
to point to the number of Soviet divisions stationed in Eastern Europe to demonstrate the need for the 
alliance and for the rearmament of the West. From the late 1960s on, levels of trust in Soviet goodwill 
were declining and there were virtually no pockets in Western society where the Soviet Union was 
genuinely seen as an alternative model of society. If NATO wanted to win the hearts and minds of the 
new generations, it had to shift its focus away from creating a negative image of the Soviet Union, as 
this had become redundant. At a time of détente and diplomatic dialogue with the East, it was important 
to demonstrate that the alliance had to continue to be militarily strong and politically cohesive so to be 
able to stand in a strong negotiating position against the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was equally 
important to show engagement with youth concerns and particularly with environmental issues.3 
This article has two key aims. First of all, it traces the history of the Committee on the 
Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). As a key component of NATO’s political and scientific 
dimensions, the CCMS was central to the alliance’s attempt to engage with the environmental 
challenges of its time. Launched with considerable fanfare in 1969, the CCMS was supposed to bring 
new life to NATO both in terms of re-energising public support as well as engaging with a variety of 
themes, issues and partners well beyond its traditional scope. As this article will discuss, NATO started 
to think in terms of crisis management, disaster relief and environmental disasters well before 1989. The 
sheer military strength of the alliance and of its partners did remain central – and notably returned to the 
forefront in 1979 – but the alliance did start to see itself as a geopolitical player, outward-looking and 
able to start new dialogue with the East on new ground as early as 1969.  
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The second aim of this article is to go beyond the careful media operation that surrounded the 
launch of the CCMS and to look at the degree of scepticism and resistance put forward by some 
European partners. The CCMS was President Nixon’s pet project. The American President saw it as a 
tool to boost support for NATO at home and to reach a higher level of political cohesion within the 
alliance itself. He assigned high calibre names like Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Henry Kissinger to 
follow the project and to convince the allies to support it. Yet, both the content of the idea and the way 
in which it was promoted irritated several allies and caused scepticism and lack of enthusiasm. NATO’s 
official publications, press communiqués and final resolutions suggest that there was great support for 
Nixon’s proposal. Documents from the British National Archives, however, help demonstrate the 
British attempts to moderate US enthusiasm and to carry out a careful balancing act between showing 
themselves willing to support the Americans while at the same time trying to gain time in the hope that 
the project would collapse on its own weaknesses. Thus, this article contributes to the argument that the 
history of NATO is the history of a continuous – and often tortuous – negotiations between its 
members. Even when, like in this case, the United States threw all its political weight and high-calibre 
names to support the project, it had to face resistance and settle for less than it had hoped. 
  
The Beginning of NATO’s Third Dimension: The Science Committee 
The Science Committee was launched with the aim of strengthening NATO’s ‘third (i.e. scientific and 
technological) dimension’, thus complementing the alliance’s military and political roles. Its key goal 
was to foster scientific education, cooperation and research. NATO science had its roots in article 2 of 
the Washington Treaty, which defined the alliance as a political organisation whose aim was to 
encourage political and economic cooperation among its members.4 NATO’s third dimension was not 
invented in the 1969. It was an integral part of the alliance’s strategy and security concept since its 
inception. The first joint scientific projects were – not surprisingly – closely linked to military defence 
and weapon standardisation. However, it soon became clear that if the alliance wanted all its members 
to make substantial progress in the field of scientific research, it had to promote a wide range of 
initiatives and joint projects.5   
The launching of the Sputniks in October and November 1957 caused consternation in the West. 
They were a tangible sign of the quick pace with which the Soviet Union was closing the gap in terms 
of research and technological development. NATO officials later spoke of a true ‘psychological shock’ 
and it/the launch(?) gave further impetus to talks already taking place following the recommendations 
of the Three Wise Men Report.6 The Atlantic Council quickly approved the creation of the Science 
Committee (SCOM), which met for the first time in March 1958 under the chairmanship of the new 
NATO’s Science Adviser.7  
The aim of the Science Committee was to advise the Council on issues connected to scientific 
and technological development and ways in which member countries could strengthen scientific 
cooperation and – most importantly – education, so as to be able to increase the number of Western 
scientists and engineers. The very fact that only a few years later the post of Science Adviser was raised 
to Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs (1962) is a sign of the increased importance of 
science within NATO.  
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Initially, the Science Committee made recommendations for the strengthening of pure science. 
The ultimate aim was to increase the number of scientists and technicians across the alliance and to 
improve scientific and technical education. The programme aimed at reinforcing international co-
operation including the free flow of specialists as well as of knowledge between the member states. 
Many of its early project had pragmatic aims: in 1959, for example, the Science Committee established 
the Subcommittee on Oceanographic Research, the Advisory Panel on the Advanced Study Institutes 
Program and the Advisory Panel on Meteorology. In 1960, it created Advisory Panels on the Research 
Grants Program, on Defence Psychology (later to become the Advisory Panel on Human Factors) and 
on Operational Research, and in 1961 the Advisory Panel on Radio-meteorology. 8  
It is important not to overestimate the impact that these initiatives had on the national research 
cultures and agendas. The Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs had no actual power to 
influence the research carried out by the member states and could not shape their priorities, let alone the 
institutional cultures of their universities and research centres. As John Krige has pointed out, joint 
research ventures were often aborted because of the fear of sharing cutting-edge discoveries with other 
members or the risk that information relating to national security may be leaked. As a result, it was 
common for the national delegations on the Civil Budget Committee to veto the most audacious 
projects. Thus, after a promising start, the pure science program budget stabilised and the projects 
approved settled at low and rather unadventurous levels, where all national delegations felt comfortable. 
These projects were hardly ground-breaking and exciting for scientists and therefore did not receive the 
participation of the biggest names in the field as it was initially hoped.9  
It is also worth pointing out that the decision-making process and research priorities of the 
Science Committee were determined by the experts volunteered by the national governments. As such, 
the experts were conscious of their own government’s concerns and the interests of the Committee were 
routinely subordinated to those of its individual members. In addition, officers responsible for everyday 
science-related issues within the national delegations often had little or no scientific training. This is 
because in most cases NATO science was hardly perceived as a priority by the national governments. 
Consequently, the person assigned to ‘science matters’ was more often than not one of the most junior 
members of the delegation and it was not uncommon for many of them to have little or no scientific 
training. Thus, while nominally all nations were interested in promoting closer scientific cooperation, in 
practice most of them did little more than pay lip service.  
The United States was the most enthusiastic participant and as such it bore a large share of the 
costs for several research projects. Not surprisingly, in the light of its commitments, the United States 
demanded a say in the Committee’s priorities and successfully had an American appointed Assistant 
Secretary General for the first ten years. In fact, it soon became a tradition that the Science Adviser, and 
later Assistant Secretary Generals for Scientific Affairs, was an American academic. For the first ten 
years all ASG for Scientific Affairs were physicists based in American universities: Norman Ramsey 
(Harvard), Frederic Seitz (Illinois), William A. Nierenberg (Berkeley), William Allis (MIT). The last 
American ASG for Scientific Affairs was John McLucas (1964–1966), who came from the Department 
of Defence.  
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American calls for tighter collaboration and higher investment were hindered by the opposition 
of the other delegations, who wanted to have an equal say on the matter. The result was frustration and 
lack of enthusiasm for pure science across the spectrum.10 Military leaders were hardly enthused by 
scientific cooperation in pure science and tended to favour its technical implementations for defence 
purposes only. Attempts to improve scientific cooperation were thus doomed to failure.11  
National research institutes initially seemed interested. They offered administrative services and, 
wherever possible, financial support to the pure science programme in the hope that this would help 
them attract further funding from their own national governments.12 Further support came from the 
North Atlantic Assembly, who discussed the issue at length during their annual meetings. Yet, all this 
had little effect on national policies. National governments continued to be reluctant to contribute 
money to projects that they deemed unrealistic and far-fetched.
 
They were interested in the Science 
Committee only as a way to channel additional funds for their own national research institutes; 
however, when this appeared not to be the case, the lack of interest jeopardised the Committee’s action. 
Academics and researchers were also often opposed to the project as they feared that new international 
research institutes would drain away the best minds. The high level of centralisation and 
bureaucratisation also condemned the Science Committee to move slowly and to settle for the lowest 
common denominator to which all countries could agree.13 
 
The Launch of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 
In the late 1960s air and water pollution were widely discussed by experts, government agencies and the 
public more broadly. The rapid pace of industrialisation and dramatic economic changes meant that all 
NATO countries suffered industrial waste problems, water and air pollution, congestion of the 
transportation systems and overcrowding of their major towns. Wide sectors of the public, and 
particularly the younger generations, became increasingly critical of the way in which the economy was 
run and the environment was damaged.14  
This was of course also the moment when President de Gaulle became increasingly critical of the 
American leadership and eventually withdrew France from the integrated allied command, demanding 
the immediate relocation of NATO Headquarters away from French soil and the closure of all the 
alliance’s military bases in France. At the heart of the Gaullist decision was the questioning of NATO’s 
political legitimacy, the nature of transatlantic relations and the role of Western Europe in the Cold 
War.15 
NATO’s answer to this very heterogeneous set of challenges was to stress the provisions of 
article 2, which provided for closer economic, political and cultural cooperation among its members. 
The Harmel Report of 1967 argued that the post-Stalin era NATO was necessary precisely because it 
meant more than military defence. The report made clear that a balance of military power was a 
prerequisite for the creation of the climate of stability in the East–West relations and that it was an 
essential precondition to allow the West to achieve progress in international negotiations with the Soviet 
bloc on issues like the division of Germany and the position of Berlin. At the same time, among the 
recommendations put forward by the report was the need to enhance political and scientific cooperation 
to boost popular support for the alliance in the member countries.  The Harmel Report advocated strong 
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defence along with new diplomatic relations with the Eastern Bloc and called on NATO members to use 
the alliance in the interests of détente.16 
As far as NATO’s information activities were concerned, the Harmel Report stated that public 
support for the alliance’s defence efforts was vital to the accomplishment of the tasks ahead, and that it 
was crucial to explain to the public both the rationale underlying NATO’s strategy and the alliance’s 
efforts to preserve the military and defence balance between East and West. Public support for the 
defence effort was an essential for the credibility of NATO’s deterrent strategy. Without it, the deterrent 
value of NATO would be seriously undermined, as military and nuclear capabilities would mean little if 
there was not public support for their use. The approval of the Report therefore brought a review of the 
NATO information effort, demonstrating that it had to focus more clearly on fostering support among 
the wider public and on explaining the need for military strength as well as political cohesion at a time 
when neither seem to have been achieved at a satisfactory degree.  
This is when the United States proposed that the alliance establish a new body to ‘explore ways 
in which the experiences and resources of the Western nations could most effectively be marshalled 
toward improving the quality of life of our people’.17 Nixon made the announcement at the North 
Atlantic Council meeting in Washington, coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of 
NATO. He declared his personal interest in the matter and pushed for immediate action. Almost 
immediately, high-profile contacts took place in the capital’s embassies. It was clear that the Nixon 
Administration was very keen on the project, as well as well organised and ready to push hard for 
immediate implementation. Yet, as discussed later, the ‘steamroller approach’ caused substantial 
irritation and frustration in the European capitals.  
In the eyes of the Americans, the new Committee would demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of 
the alliance, its peaceful nature and its ability to adapt to new challenges.18 Stephen Macekura has 
argued convincingly that, in effect, Nixon’s primary objective was to gain more support for the alliance 
back at home, where NATO suffered waning support. Other historians, like Brooks Flippen and Jacob 
Darwin Hamblin, have underlined that Nixon’s environmental concerns should be seen primarily as a 
tool for détente.19 
Despite the scepticism of several European members – which shall be discussed more in detail 
later – the North Atlantic Council agreed to establish the Committee on the Challenges of Modern 
Society (CCMS).20 Together with the Science Committee, the CCMS was supposed to become a central 
part of NATO’s ‘third dimension’, complementing the alliance’s military and political roles. The CCMS 
was much more outward-looking than the Science Committee both in terms of the themes it focused on, 
like pollution, car safety and urbanisation, which were great concerns of the public, as well as in terms 
of the level of media attention that it attracted – attention that was encouraged and at times carefully 
orchestrated by NATO’s information officers.21  
Like the Science Committee, the CCMS too was rooted in article 2, according to which member 
countries are committed to promote conditions of stability and well-being for their people, and, as such, 
it was presented as an integral part of the alliance’s security concept. According to the new narrative, it 
had become clear that in addition to protecting the West from military attacks, the alliance had to ensure 
that national governments were ready to react promptly to natural disasters and that they understood the 
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wide-ranging implications of massive industrialisation and urbanisation. Most importantly, it was 
crucial to prevent natural disasters by working together and by studying the causes and consequences of 
environmental problems.22 
From the start, it was understood that the CCMS would be a new kind of committee, 
revolutionary in mission and modus operandi. The CCMS was to further the political aims and overall 
cohesion of the alliance by focusing on a limited number of well-defined problems. Learning a lesson 
from the failures of the Science Committee, the CCMS had a limited mandate, no budget and no full-
time international staff. During the Cold War, the Committee’s activity was characterised by a high 
degree of decentralisation. National representatives, at cabinet and subcabinet levels, met twice a year in 
plenary sessions. No funds from the NATO budget were allocated and projects had to be initiated by 
member countries. If the Council approved them, they were administered and paid for by the proposing 
country and other interested national governments. The ‘pilot country’ would also coordinate the 
project’s execution, prepare the necessary reports and, most importantly, promote follow-up action at 
national and international levels. Precisely because of its limited mandate and light structure, it was 
hoped that the CCMS could avoid the problems that had hampered progress within the Science 
Committee.  
Three key concepts characterised the work of the CCMS: first, all its work should lead to 
government policy formulation and legislation. Hence, the country who ran the pilot study would also 
monitor progress and press for follow up action – like, for example, new legislation or further study – 
by exerting political pressure in all international organisations and through bi-lateral contacts. Second, 
the CCMS would not be running its own independent research but would build upon research carried 
out by national governments, their research institutions and other international organisations. It would 
be directed towards questions of government policy formulation and legislation, suggesting ways to 
bring about improvements to the environment and social policies.23 Finally, all CCMS results should be 
open and accessible to international organisations or individual countries anywhere in the world without 
prejudice.24 Because of the transnational nature of the topics included in the CCMS’s scope, the results 
transcended political ideology and therefore needed to be open to all countries ‘including developing 
countries and the Communist ones’.25 Publicity was deemed crucial as the CCMS dealt with problems 
that affected the daily life of the citizens of the alliance and beyond and contributed to the policy-
making process. NATO had to explain why the alliance was engaging in these new fields and to what 
extent it was not duplicating what was already being done by other organisations, particularly the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).26  
Given that the primary task of the CCMS was to demonstrate the progressive character of the 
alliance, it was essential to avoid overstatements and minimise disappointment. The risk was that the 
alliance would become hostage to its own ambitious goals. This was a point put forward mostly by the 
European members, who were aware of their own public’s scepticism regarding anything that may taste, 
even remotely, like ‘propaganda’. Any publicity campaign involving the CCMS had to be carefully 
measured against the prospects of concrete results and stress that factual results could be obtained only 
gradually and with the cooperation of all nations involved. All public statements about the CCMS had 
to avoid overambitious statements, which were deemed counterproductive.27  
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All pilot studies were unclassified and were made available to any other countries and 
international organisations. The press was invited to the CCMS inaugural session and for the first time 
the invitation was formally extended to journalists from outside the NATO area. Journalists were 
welcomed at the headquarters and the invitation was renewed every time the CCMS met in plenary 
session. The CCMS press conferences were very popular with the media and the facilities for the press 
in the Council Room soon became inadequate and a larger conference room had to be created.28  
In all NATO and NATO-related publications, the CCMS was given several pages, with pictures 
and articles by leading experts on the topics studied by the CCMS. The NATO Information Service also 
commissioned a short film entitled The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (1974), which 
stands out from the rest of the films circulated in this period for its artistic choice of frame and for its 
lyric tone.29 The United States Information Agency also planned a series of film and newsreels to 
publicise the activity of the CCMS.30 Archival documents reveal that the NATO information officers 
engaged proactively with the national media to give maximum coverage to the first pilot studies carried 
out by the CCMS.31 In all cases, the CCMS was presented to the public as one of the many examples of 
the multi-faceted nature of the alliance and of its entirely peaceful aims, a refrain repeated several times 
in all information material items.  
The difference with the Science Committee was therefore not only procedural but also 
substantive: the CCMS was key to the alliance’s attempt to engage with the public and to respond to 
youth’s disaffection and concerns. At the same time, the launch of the CCMS marked a decisive step 
towards a new strategic concept: the label ‘environment’ encompassed a variety of subjects including 
disaster relief and crisis management. As discussed later in this article, at the time the CCMS could do 
little more than recommend more coordination among its members and suggest ways to work together 
with non-NATO members. It is therefore very difficult to qualify its success. However, the work of the 
CCMS should be seen as an attempt to redefine the security concept of the alliance and the idea of what 
constituted a threat. It was a first tangible sign that the alliance was moving towards a different kind of 
defence, which was not only military defence but defence of their populations and their well being. It 
points to a new awareness of the importance of out-of-area events and of the need to secure cooperation 
beyond the alliance itself. These ideas were very new at the time, marking a first important step away 
from direct military confrontation and helping to lay the basis for the post-1989 NATO’s strategy and 
security.  
 
Behind the Scenes 
According to the NATO Letter and several NATO-related publications, Nixon’s proposal for the 
Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society was ground-breaking. According to the narrative 
established at the time, the proposal was warmly received by the alliance and its members. The very fact 
that only eight months after the announcement, the CCMS was already operative was seen as a sign of 
its significance and widespread support. Subsequent articles in NATO-sponsored publications built on 
this idea by stressing the significance of the first pilot-studies, magnifying, if not overstating, their 
impact. 
It is therefore important to look at the reasons behind Nixon’s 1969 proposal, in addition to his 
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personal interest in the environment.32 A few months after the publication of the Harmel Report, the 
Czechoslovak crisis shook the alliance; however, it did not alter NATO’s basic view that the danger of 
an all-out Soviet assault was low. The alliance – and particularly its European members – were abuzz 
about the crisis’ implications on détente and were keen to consult about how best to produce a united 
front. As discussed by several scholars, the history of the alliance during the Cold War was 
characterised by a tendency to fragmentation whenever tensions in East–West relations subsided. Each 
time the Soviet threat was allegedly reduced to manageable proportions, the differences among the 
allies mushroomed into sources of potential division. As a consequence, there were new calls for 
expanded consultation and pragmatic cooperation particularly from the smaller members. Yet, different 
views and security strategies persisted and created political tension. The result was ‘a growing paradox, 
in which the alliance actually works better while dissatisfaction about it increases’.33  
 The Nixon administration was aware that the alliance’s political fragmentation might undermine 
its deterrent value and was keen to make constructive use of the call for enhanced consultation and 
increased cooperation. The correspondence between the State Department and the US Delegation at 
NATO reveals that the Americans were looking for effective ways to cement the alliance and overcome 
the difficulties of too many ‘special cases’.34 In addition, at a time when the United States was pursuing 
bilateral relations with Moscow, it was important to show that Washington remained committed to the 
alliance both for the success of the negotiations themselves as well as to reassure the NATO allies. In 
the eyes of the American administration, the launch of the CCMS squared the circle. It offered the 
opportunity to show their commitment to the alliance, to address the concern of the younger generations 
and to bring new non-ideological issues to the diplomatic table. Hence the CCMS was crucial  to 
reassure the European allies and, as Macekura has argued, to boost support for the alliance at home.35 
Jacob Darwin Hamblin argues that Nixon saw the CCMS primarily – if not exclusively – as a tool with 
which to engage on environmental issues with the East as this allowed the President to move the 
discussion on to non-ideological territory. Yet, recent published sources suggest that appeasing the 
NATO allies while the United States was engaged in bi-lateral talks with the Soviet Union was – at the 
very least – the ultimate aim behind the launch of the CCMS.36 
Given that one of the key reasons to launch the project was to reassure the allies of US 
commitment to the alliance, the State Department monitored their reactions closely. According to Elliot 
Richardson, Under Secretary of State, despite seemingly mixed reactions, the Europeans were 
supportive overall.37  In order to maintain momentum, the Nixon administration did not waste time and 
tried to obtain an early agreement in principle among the Permanent Representative for the 
establishment of the Committee. The assumption was that once the idea of a new Committee had been 
approved, the alliance could move on to the practical organisational arrangements.  
The President attached personal support to the project and put it in the hands of two of his closest 
advisers: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who at the time was Adviser for Urban Affairs, and Henry 
Kissinger, National Security Advisor. Their role was to push the project forward and to make sure that it 
saw the light as soon as possible and in as an unadulterated form as diplomacy would allow it.38 
Kissinger liaised directly between the US NATO Delegation and the President, a further sign of its 
importance and urgency.  Russell Train, who took over from Moynihan as head of the US CCMS 
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delegation in 1971, recalls that White House stationery was routinely used for all CCMS-related 
documents for all internal and external communications to give everybody a sense of the President’s 
personal interest in the matter.39 The Americans found an enthusiastic ally in Dr Gunnar Randers, 
Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs and Acting Chairman of the CCMS, who was happy 
to lend his influence to the Americans and to push for quick implementation.40 
The American enthusiasm was frustrated by what was perceived as the slow and cautious 
response of the Europeans, who pointed out that creating new structures within NATO and engaging in 
new fields had to be discussed thoroughly at national and alliance levels before proceeding any further. 
This attitude irritated the Nixon Administration, who had made proposals through NAC precisely to cut 
across bureaucratic lines, avoid the traditional lengthy discussion at Foreign Ministries’ level and 
proceed without prior consultation with the member governments. Yet, they had miscalculated. 
Precisely because they had made their unexpected announcement in the Council, they had caused 
consternation and scepticism among the diplomats in Brussels as well as back in the capitals. To 
European ears, Nixon’s plans sounded as an announcement without consultation and consideration for 
the allies’ opinion.41 
In order to smooth what could still be called a miscommunication issue, NATO Secretary 
General Manlio Brosio agreed to carry out a tour of the capitals and to gather support for the project. In 
most European capitals, Brosio was welcome, although the reactions of the European allies continued to 
be ‘responsive in principle but cautious in practice’.42 Many governments wondered why the new body 
should be placed within NATO and not within the United Nations and OECD, where the wider 
membership would allow to transcend ideological and geographical barriers and rely on a wider range 
of expertise. The Americans – whose primary aim was to make the alliance more appealing to their own 
public – argued: 
 
Because NATO is there. It is unique. For almost two decades now it has carried on, at ever 
increasing levels of complexity, a massive system of technology transfer. There has been 
no such sustained experience in the history of the world. If technology is the issue, NATO 
is uniquely the forum in which to raise it . . . NATO is doubly appropriate, for here is an 
institution which year in and year out has been able to command attention and response at 
the highest levels of governments.43 
 
In addition – the Americans argued – NATO was one of the few international organisations that had a 
membership consisting of countries with the same sort of problems in terms of pollution, infrastructure, 
urbanisation and so on, and could therefore work as a small and coherent group. They responded to the 
claim that international organisations like the United Nations would be more suitable by saying that 
precisely because of the sheer number and diversity of its members it would be impossible to reach any 
useful conclusion.44 They stressed that improving the image of the alliance was not only an American 
problem, but that it was also essential for all its members to show that there was more to NATO than 
tanks and fire jets. If the public had to be won over, they had to be shown that the alliance and its 
members understood their concerns about the environment, nuclear energy and society. 
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The risk of duplication was more difficult to brush off and doubts remained. Timid attempts to 
liaise with the OECD were to no avail and showed that NATO struggled not to step on other 
organisations’ toes and to be perceived as a credible forum in which to discuss the wider implications of 
environmental issues. In the same period several other international organisations engaged with 
environmental concerns. At the time of the launch of the CCMS, for example, the United Nations called 
for a major conference on the ‘Human Environment’, which took place in 1972 in Stockholm. Hence 
many argued that other institutions, with a larger membership, and thus a better reflection of the area 
affected by pollution and other environmental problems, were better suited to discuss these issues.45  
The CCMS supporters argued that there was in fact no risk of duplication as the CCMS would 
not carry out any new research but rather collate available knowledge and ensure open discussion 
among experts in the field and better communication between researchers and policy-makers. In 
addition, it was claimed that even if, to a certain extent, there happened to be some duplication, this 
would not be harmful as the ultimate aim of the new initiative was to create momentum for policy 
change. Therefore, if it did happen that, let’s say, the United Nations and NATO reached a similar 
conclusion, then there would be more political pressure on national governments to do something about 
it. 46 What the CCMS supporters could not explain was what would happen if two or more international 
organisations reached different conclusions. 
The Americans argued that the CCMS demonstrated NATO’s genuine concern for the 
environment and that it also allowed the alliance to move on to new diplomatic ground. The 
environment transcended ideological barriers and could allow initiating new East–West relations. Alas, 
as several historians have already demonstrated, this approach quickly ran into difficulties. If the 
Eastern Bloc was keen to participate, the West had to face new criticism from developing countries, for 
whom the environment was a ‘rich man’s problem’ and the key issues were poverty and development. 
In order to give a further sign that the CCMS was very important to the President, the Americans 
toned down their voice in other international forums, such as, for example, during the discussions 
within the OECD’s Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee on the Environment. At the first meeting they had 
pushed decisively to decide structure and aims; later they appeared more cautious and even expressed 
doubts as to whether the OECD was the right body for future expanded environmental work. Many 
NATO allies read this move as a sign that the Nixon Administration wanted the focus to remain on the 
CCMS.47  
The way in which high-level American officials were dispatched to the other NATO capitals to 
gather support, together with the demand that the new body to be set up immediately and without any 
further consultation, was disconcerting to the European allies. In July and August 1969 there was a 
dramatic increase in the pace of communication and meetings with an aim to make the CCMS operative 
by the end of the year. This caused consternation and uneasiness in the European capital: one British 
Foreign Office official commented on the margins of one of these documents with the word ‘Horror!’48 
Many countries did not have the appropriate structures and expertise for coordinating internal work on 
environmental problems and were in the process of setting up new ones so as to be able to fully 
participate in the CCMS’s work, which demanded both political will and resources.49 Yet, it was 
difficult – if not impossible – to resist the pressure coming form Washington without creating a major 
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diplomatic crisis. By November, all European members had agreed to participate, albeit with different 
degrees of enthusiasm.  
 
British Scepticism 
Initially, Foreign Office officials were cautious. They were aware of Nixon’s personal interest in 
environmental matters and of the need to improve the image of the alliance among the public. They 
knew that they had to appear keen and that they should not be seen to undermine the presidential 
initiative; at the same time, they were deeply critical of NATO’s new role in environmental issues. They 
also feared unnecessary duplications with what was already being done more effectively by other 
international organisations. What was required was a careful balancing act showing willingness to 
participate while at the same time gaining time in the hope that the project would lose steam or divert its 
focus.  
Archival documents reveal that several other Whitehall departments were equally sceptical of 
Nixon’s proposals. They felt they would not be able to meet the additional demands this new body 
would impose on their experts. Many claimed that their staff was already ‘heavily committed in various 
international organisations which are working in similar fields of interest at present’ and that would be 
impossible for the United Kingdom to provide the adequate high-level expertise that the Americans 
expected.50 This was in fact a time when the OECD, the Council of Europe and the United Nations had 
launched an array of wide-ranging initiatives concerning the environment, health and society in 
response to the public outcry at several natural and man-made disasters that had occurred in the 1960s, 
as well as to youth’s more general disaffection. The result was the mushrooming of conferences and 
experts’ meetings and the consequent insupportable pressure on the limited number of experts 
available.51 As one FCO official pointed out: 
 
everyone is demanding high-level representation; they cannot have it. In many cases we 
cannot provide low-level representation and even if we could, the result might be worse than 
not attending at all. . . . The time has come when we have really got to decide where the 
least harm would be done if we dropped out altogether.52 
 
A good example was the demand for experts in the field of air pollution, which was indeed a pressing 
topic at the time. The major British experts worked at the Warren Spring Laboratory in Stevenage. In 
early 1970 they really felt the pressure of too many international commitments, as they had to send an 
expert in September to the Council of Europe, a team to work on the OECD air pollution modelling 
project and were also asked if they could contribute to the CCMS. Their answer was clear and 
uncompromising: ‘WSL see CCMS work as an activity of relatively low priority (as we all do), and 
there just is not sufficient manpower to cover WSL’s other more important international commitments 
and CCMS as well’’53 The Warren Spring Laboratory was not alone in complaining and, according to a 
Whitehall memo, several ‘UK experts have started to protest quite loudly at having to go to CCMS 
meetings. If we push them any harder they may make a public stink about it.’54 
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Several Whitehall departments were also critical of specific suggestions. For example, the Home 
Office opposed the idea of NATO’s involvement in crime and drug trafficking as a lot of work was 
already being carried out by the UN’s Social Defence Research Institute, the Council of Europe and 
Interpol, and there was no need for any interference in the delicate work of these agencies.55 The 
Department of Education and Science, which was going to be directly involved in the project, was 
highly critical too. They preferred: 
 
not to have the Committee set up. Of course, I recognise that we cannot now oppose the 
Committee’s creation, but it would be desirable not to lose sight of our basic attitude to 
this proposal; I hope we would therefore be careful not to argue too strongly in support of 
the present proposal to the extent that other countries would forebear to voice their 
misgivings.56 
 
FCO officials were equally sceptical of Nixon’s suggestion of placing the new committee under the 
chairmanship of ASG Gunnar Randers and his Science Committee. They thought that in his position as 
chairman Randers may feel encouraged to ‘promote expensive projects and steer them into his own 
Department’. However, given the support that Randers had from Nixon himself, the FCO was fully 
aware that it may now be ‘very difficult to keep him out of the chair’.57 More importantly, the FCO 
thought that placing the new committee within the remit of the Science Committee might shift the 
emphasis further towards technological problems and away from the social sciences. The British 
believed, in fact, that the CCMS should engage in social science rather than in technology and research. 
Social sciences reduced the risk of duplicating what was already being done by other organisations. In 
addition, they genuinely thought that social science problems were basic to the security of the alliance 
and of its members. The student and worker unrests were signs that wider social issues were at stake 
and that it was essential to tackle them so to be able to ensure support for the alliance and for its 
strategic concept. In addition, according to the British, this new approach would have had the advantage 
of involving new experts, who could devote themselves to the CCMS.58 Hence, in their preliminary 
response to the American proposals, FCO officials suggested ‘that the role of the Science Committee 
should be left open until it has become clear how much emphasis NATO wants to give to technological 
as opposed to social fields’.59  
In the corridors of Whitehall there was also frustration about not having been consulted prior to 
the announcement, or at the very least warned. In the eyes of the British, there appeared to be a lack of 
appreciation on the part of the Americans for the relatively smaller means of its partners:   
 
it seems that the most difficult problem will be to find ways of getting the Americans to 
recognise the need for a selective approach to the development of intergovernmental 
organisation activities. Their habit of making a massive assault on the problems of the 
moment is sustainable by the massive resources of money and manpower they can 
command, but the technique is not one that transplants very readily to the countries of 
Western Europe.60 
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During the preliminary stages of the negotiations, the British Delegation at NATO was instructed to 
keep a low profile and let other delegations express concern. The United Kingdom should not appear to 
take the lead neither in promoting nor in slowing down the project.61 
In summer 1969 Secretary General Manlio Brosio and Assistant Secretary General Gunnar 
Randers visited London as part of their tour of the capitals to gather information about the position of 
each government. At the meeting, the British emphasised that NATO should refrain from taking 
independent action and should instead foster interest in the work carried out by other international 
organisations, which were seen as better equipped to devise and execute environmental programmes. 
Their wider membership also allowed other international organisations to avoid giving the impression 
that the environment label actually hid some military, or in any case Cold War-related, intentions. In 
addition, FCO officials suggested that NATO focus on social rather than technological problems as the 
former were not yet the focus of international cooperation. Most of all, the British were very critical of 
the creation of a separate new committee and advised that the new initiative should start by keeping a 
low profile, at least at the beginning, to avoid raising unrealistic expectations among the public, which 
could eventually backfire.62 
To the FCO’s surprise, Brosio seemed to agree with most of their suggestions and spoke in 
favour of the new committee as ‘a ginger group’ that would act as a catalyst and stimulate the work of 
other organisations already engaged in talks.63 Brosio seemed receptive to the idea that NATO should 
involve itself in social rather than in technical fields and agreed that the alliance had neither the 
expertise nor the room to carry out new research. The impression left with the FCO officials was that 
Brosio was keen to follow up on Nixon’s proposal but there was still time to discuss things in details.64 
Brosio then travelled to the United States, where he was presented with a full list of subjects for 
the CCMS, mostly technological in nature. To the consternation of the British officials following his 
meetings in Washington, Brosio observed that ‘while we had felt initially that the social field was the 
most promising, some Governments had suggested that social problems were more complicated and that 
involvement with them might expose NATO to criticism’.65 The Americans found unexpected support 
in the French, who expressed concerns about NATO’s involvement in social issues, which – according 
to them – could lead to unpleasant interference in the internal affairs of its members and restrict national 
sovereignty.66 
Soon after the return of Brosio to Brussels the diplomatic exchanges regarding the CCMS moved 
quickly and the FCO was surprised both by the level of American involvement and by the consequent 
speed with which the alliance moved forward.67 It seemed already too late to influence anything, and the 
British – along with their European counterparts – were left with no choice but to show to be willing 
participants. The FCO found Randers’ report ‘unsatisfactory in a number of ways, notably in its sketchy 
and incomplete treatment of the terms of reference’.68  
The Preparatory Committee met in September 1969 and the British Delegation was instructed to 
reinforce the point that the United Kingdom saw the new body as a ‘ginger group’ and that as such it 
should not engage in research.69 Given its scepticism and frustration, the FCO was reluctant to send 
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high-profile names to the meeting and resisted the American request for the presence of Sir Solly 
Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser in the Cabinet Office.70 
The Preparatory Committee’s papers show evidence of the predictable European resistance to the 
creation of a new powerful and free-standing committee as well as the concern that the CCMS would 
lead the alliance into new uncharted territory where there was no consensus within the Council. The 
Europeans demanded clear and binding terms of reference, a limited mandate, light structure, no budget 
and no full-time staff. This was all agreed and it was decided that the Committee would meet in two 
annual plenary sessions at cabinet or subcabinet levels to provide guidance and approve new pilot 
projects. It was also made clear that the CCMS would be powerless to force implementation and that the 
members, including those who had run the pilot study, were free to act according to their national 
interests and priorities.71 
Given that several experts had already declared themselves too busy to dedicate time to the 
CCMS, the Foreign Office initially planned to use the staff already available within their NATO 
permanent delegation for all CCMS-related work. Yet, the Americans expressed their desire for high-
calibre names to show that the project had the full support of the British government and to dispel the 
impression that this was a purely American-driven operation. The American Ambassador in London 
personally visited the Foreign Office to discuss the matter and similar pressure was put on the British 
Ambassador in Washington.72 Yet, the FCO resisted and, to the disappointments of the Americans, 
eventually agreed to send Dr Cottrell, Deputy Chief Adviser. This was more than the FCO had planned 
to but less than the Americans had asked for, which led to frustration on both sides. 
Given the British outstanding commitment to the Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment and the increasing discussions within NATO about the challenges of modern society, the 
FCO created a new desk within its Science and Technology Department to deal with the problems 
connected to the human environment, which indirectly allowed the Foreign Office to show at least a 
certain degree of engagement with the CCMS.73  
It is worth mentioning that this was also the time in which Britain was experiencing 
environmental disasters first hand. In the spring of 1967 the Torrey Canyon oil spill on the southwest 
coast of the United Kingdom affected hundreds of miles of coastline in the United Kingdom, France, 
Guernsey and Spain. In the summer of 1969, precisely when the FCO was pondering the British 
position regarding the CCMS, an estimated 50-100,000 seabirds were found dead in the Irish Sea due to 
sea pollution.74 These events of course made the environmental issue very pressing but this did not 
mean that the CCMS was seen as the best answer. 
The first plenary meeting of the CCMS took place in December 1969, only eight months after 
Nixon’s speech.75 The event was at the centre of a highly orchestrated media campaign with journalists 
from all NATO countries being accredited and admitted to the plenary session for the first time in 
December 1969.76 In the following months, observers from non-NATO members were also admitted to 
plenary sessions and to the meetings of the Committee’s pilot study groups, although the Council 
reserved the right to consider-case-by-case each time.77  
Denis Richards of the British Delegation recalled the inaugural CCMS meeting as a being 
pervaded by ‘self-congratulatory euphoria’. In his words, it was in fact: 
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a rather messy meeting because, under pressure from the Americans, a topsy-turvy 
format was followed whereby we had first the presentation of the individual pilot projects 
and then, only this morning, we discussed the Committee’s procedure.  
 
According to Richards, the Americans dominated the scene by ‘sheer weight of numbers’, with three 
senior figures at the table and twenty-five others sitting behind them. The UnitedKingdom, by contrast, 
sported Dr Cottrell and Mr Richards at the table and nobody behind them. The Germans also sent a 
high-profile delegation led by Professor Dahrendorf, Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
Concerning the presentation of potential pilot project, Richards lamented that Cottrell could not go into 
any detail about the British proposal on individual and group motivation due to the lack of participation 
of the Social Science Research Council and noted that: ‘it must have been obvious to all that we had not 
done our homework’.78 Dr Cottrell himself described his own contribution as ‘a voluminous if 
insubstantial soufflé’ and doubted whether he succeeded in hiding the proposal’s lack of intellectual 
content. Hedid not think that: 
 
The United Kingdom made much of an impression at the meeting. We are almost alone 
amongst the major countries in not sending special experts to the meeting. . . . We were also 
nearly unique in not tabling any papers at the meeting . . . I think that our failure so far to 
follow through at the substantive level may lead to some scepticism about our professed 
interest in this NATO initiative. This is not a good way to win friends and influence 
people.79 
 
The United Kingdom was also almost alone in not offering to co-pilot a project, and Alan Cottrell 
stressed that it was important ‘to consider at least whether we ought to declare fairly quickly that we 
would be willing to co-pilot the German study on knowledge and decision-making. If we do not join in 
a bit more, we shall find ourselves rather isolated’.80 In a private conversation with Solly Zuckerman, 
Cottrell warned that:  
 
because of this very strong American interest in fostering all international aspects of 
environmental questions, and because they feel the need for a dependable partner, in their 
initiatives in this field, we have much to gain politically by responding more positively to 
their invitations, quite apart from technical and in some cases commercial benefits that 
may derive from our participation in these new international developments.81  
 
The reason Dr Cottrell’s proposal was so vague was because the FCO persisted in their effort to shift 
the focus to social science with a proposal for a pilot study on individual and group motivation. 
Unfortunately, however, they were eventually unable to pull it off because their key partner, the Social 
Science Research Council, refused to participate. The SSRC was afraid it might damage its own 
reputation and international collaborations by association with a political organisation. In addition, the 
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SSRC resented that no funds were to be made available for the research to be carried out for the pilot 
study and that the Council was asked to pay ‘for an enterprise which is essentially a diplomatic one’. 82  
Thus, the FCO was forced to come up with an alternative plan quickly and eventually suggested 
a slightly amended proposal on motivation and work satisfaction. The delay and the half-baked proposal 
meant that once again Britain gave the impression of being recalcitrant, to great annoyance of the 
Americans. British officials in the NATO Delegation doubted that ‘the public image of the alliance will 
be significantly improved as a result in the near future.’83 
Eventually, continuous pressure from Washington, combined with the advice coming from 
Cottrell and the British Delegation at NATO, persuaded the Foreign Office to step up its game and to 
send Sir Solly Zuckerman to the CCMS plenary meeting in October 1970.84 Yet, it was made clear that 
Sir Solly would be able to attend only the first day and that there was no guarantee that he or anybody 
of a similar rank would be sent in the future. In addition, the British representatives to the CCMS would 
be given a well-informed proposal for a pilot study on individual and group motivation, ‘otherwise we 
should either look silly or else lay ourselves open to the charge that we were not serious in our declared 
intention of playing a constructive part in the Committee’.85 
It should be pointed out that although the proposal for a pilot study on individual and group 
motivation eventually went ahead and gained CCMS approval, the Americans were less than 
enthusiastic about it and regarded it as essentially a lot of hot air. Mr Moynihan thought it ‘to be too 
narrowly conceived . . . and not of sufficiently wide application in the international field’.86 When Mr 
Moynihan visited in London in April 1970 on his way to Brussels, he made no secret of the fact that he 
felt that the British remained disappointingly lukewarm about the CCMS.87 Yet, for diplomatic reasons, 
and to show to the other members that the British were on board, at the CCMS meeting Mr Moynihan 
supported the pilot study on individual and group motivation. Yet, despite the fact that the British 
proposal received the go-ahead, Cottrell had the distinct feeling that there was the lingering impression 
that ‘the United Kingdom was not taking an adequate part in the work that has been put in hand’ and 
that Britain was still thought of being recalcitrant.88  
The launch of the pilot studies had happened so quickly that it became impossible – and indeed 
detrimental to national interests – not to participate. In the words of Ronald Arculus, of the FCO 
Science and Technology Department: 
 
we are all agreed that NATO is not the best place to handle the substance of international 
environmental work. But the fact is that the Americans have now succeeded in starting a 
good deal of international discussion in the CCMS, some of which may lead to 
developments which may affect the UK, whether we like it or not. The Americans clearly 
suspect us of dragging our feet; and the other European countries . . . have since showed 
themselves more willing than ourselves to contribute effectively to CCMS’s work. In other 
words, we now face a situation where we will probably need to participate in CCMS 
activities to protect our own interests (for example over motor vehicle safety) and to help 
steer them in a sensible direction.89  
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The pilot study on road safety led by the Americans was a good example indeed. According to the 
Director of the Road Research Laboratory, the United Kingdom could not participate in the pilot study 
because its experts were already heavily committed elsewhere. Yet, the study had direct implications on 
the car-manufacturing sector, and the British were keen to protect their carmakers. So, albeit 
reluctantly, they had to take part. The United Kingdom appointed Dr Lyons (Director, Road Research 
Laboratory, Bracknell) to lead the British experts. The Americans organised a conference on road 
safety in Detroit and invited representatives from the automobile industries from several NATO 
countries and beyond. Japan, for example, sent representatives from government and industry; Sweden 
was also invited and Saab and Volvo participated. Among the British car manufacturers, Rolls Royce, 
Kangol (seat belts) and Smiths Instruments were represented.90 
Other pilot studies raised more difficult questions and directly contradicted the principle of non-
interference and non-duplication established at the launch of the CCMS. It was proposed, for example, 
to run a pilot study on oil spills. The Foreign Office and several other departments in Whitehall were 
sceptical of – if not outright opposed to – the idea. There was an obvious risk of duplicating what was 
already being done effectively by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), 
which also had the non-negligible advantage of including important key nations like the Soviet Union 
and Japan. In the eyes of the FCO, a study on oil spills could be easily misconstrued by non-NATO 
members as a façade behind which hid military and strategic planning.91 
In the first couple of years, the CCMS moved at a hectic pace and launched numerous pilot 
studies on a variety of topics. This led to the frustration of many European members, particularly the 
smaller ones who often did not have the sufficient number of experts and the right know-how. Even the 
British, who could rely on a much wider pool of experts than, let’s say, Belgium, found it difficult to 
cope. Mr Lyons, Director of the Road Research Laboratory, put forward a rather critical view:  
 
the American steamroller tactics in the CCMS were particularly difficult for us. It was 
evident that the United States was unilaterally trying to impose its own solutions upon its 
NATO partners. The road safety project had now snowballed. There were some 8 or 9 
studies on the agenda and the US wanted the other CCMS members to play their full part in 
all of them. What was particularly galling was that, in most of these sectors, the United 
States was well behind Europe.92 
 
In December 1970 the British Delegation to NATO sent a report about the first year of life of the 
CCMS, which makes interesting reading for both the frank tone and the colourful details. The CCMS 
was at the stage of making the first recommendations to the Council. The first eight pilot projects had 
developed at dramatically different speeds and many had been hampered by continued discussion about 
the risk of avoiding duplication and by the excessive demand on experts’ time. According to the report 
‘the battle against duplication was not won when the terms of reference were agreed. It has to be fought 
over and over again’. Many Europeans resented the American high-pressure tactics: ‘the authorities in 
Washington may take months to decide that they want the CCMS to do something; but once they have 
decided, they want action within days’. Sometimes meetings were called only three days ahead of time 
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and, needless to say, the Americans demanded – almost without exception – high-level representation, 
regardless of the level of expertise.  
 
It is no longer possible to joke about this, for fear of being taken seriously. Ask someone in 
the cafeteria whether he has heard that the Americans have just announced a Cabinet-level 
Colloquium on the Noise of Motor Bicycles to be held in Newfoundland starting tomorrow 
night; and he is more likely to start to his feet in apprehension than to smile back in 
disbelief.93 
 
It also looked as if in its first year the CCMS had taken up an undue amount of the Council’s time, for 
the most part on procedural questions. On the positive side, according to the British Delegation, there 
had not been any case of obvious duplication and ‘the CCMS has certainly had a gingering-up effect on 
some NATO countries’, particularly on those who did not have a governmental interest in the 
environment. In addition, smaller countries with fewer or no experts in some of these fields profited 
considerably from the exchange of expertise. Overall, the CCMS seemed to be building a reputation ‘for 
injecting more urgency to international work on the environment’. 
Yet, the authors pointed out that ‘this Delegation has found itself acting at various times as a post 
office, a shock absorber and an oil can; we are regularly interposed between American dynamism and 
the understandable reluctance of Whitehall to provide experts at short notice for CCMS-sponsored 
meetings’. Finally, the UK Delegation was pleased to announce that Mr Moynihan was about to return 
to academic life. This was a great relief for the British officials in Brussels and London, who had found 
him personally difficult to deal with. The delegation suggested that ‘it is possible that American interest 
in the CCMS may tail off after his departure’. The report concluded that the CCMS may ‘go on 
producing some useful results, perhaps at the cost of disproportionate effort’ but ‘we doubt that the 
public image of the alliance will be significantly improved as a result in the near future’.94  
The British were not alone in thinking in these terms and the most incensed were the CCMS’s 
supporters, who were disappointed and frustrated. In an internal memo to Brosio, Randers complained 
that the flow of information on the status of pilot studies was slow, that progress of several studies was 
‘sluggish’, that ‘recommendations tended to be imprecise and generalised’ and that there was still too 
much emphasis on research rather than on recommendations. Finally, despite all the efforts to avoid it, 
Randers also had to recognise that there were ‘overlaps with efforts of other organisations.’95 
 
The CCMS in Action  
Although the primary purpose of this article is to examine the diplomatic tensions behind the launch of 
the CCMS, it may be helpful to examine here briefly the subsequent development of the Committee as 
it offers further evidence of how the CCMS’s work expanded the alliance’s vision and interest in out-of-
area events.  
At its first plenary session in December 1969, the CCMS launched seven pilot studies, three of 
which saw the United States as the pilot nation. This again showed the level of US commitment. Soon 
after that, Moynihan was called back to Washington and was replaced as chairman of the US delegation 
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to the CCMS by Russell E. Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality.96 CCMS’s 
responsibility remained in the White House and Train was to report directly to the President, while Mr 
Moynihan continued association to the CCMS as a consultant.97 Before leaving his CCMS post, a 
confidant of Patrick Moynihan informed the President that ‘the CCMS is probably now the most active 
and productive international activity of its kind’. Yet Moynihan was aware that ‘it will take a long time 
for the program to become self-sustaining’ and warned that ‘any relaxation of American effort during 
that interval is likely to be fatal’.98 
The West Germans enthusiastically supported the Americans. The CCMS received strong 
personal backing from Chancellor Willy Brandt, who sent high-calibre names to all meetings.99 In the 
words of a British official: ‘the Germans are evidently now regarded as the blue-eyed boys of the 
environment by the Americans’.100 This was a time in which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
had set on a new course in its relations with the Eastern Bloc. Ostpolitik sent alarms bells ringing in the 
Western capitals and many feared that new Chancellor could jeopardise West Germany’s alliance to the 
West in the name of new German relations. The support of Willy Brant for the CCMS should therefore 
be seen as an attempt to reaffirm the FRG’s commitment to the alliance. More specifically, the CCMS 
allowed Brandt to throw his support towards NATO’s political and environmental dimensions rather 
than its purely military role, thus avoiding new tensions with the East.  
The French also showed a genuine interest in the project. The CCMS – and NATO science more 
broadly – allowed France to take an active part in the alliance despite being out of the integrated 
command structure. France became increasingly more interested in the alliance’s third dimension and 
since 1980 all Assistant Secretary Generals for Scientific Affairs have been French officials.101 
However, it should not be forgotten that the other European members merely paid lip service to the 
programme, with some occasionally voicing their concern openly. The Norwegians, for example, were 
initially rather hostile towards the project. Under Prime Minister Per Borten, Norway did not participate 
in the CCMS.  Only a few years later, following the establishment of a new Ministry of the 
Environment, Norway joined the Committee and took part in some pilot studies. 
In 1971 NATO launched the CCMS Fellowship Programme and the CCMS continued to launch 
new pilot studies, which focused primarily on technology and scientific knowledge transfer. 102 
However, as Macekura has pointed out, in his second term Richard Nixon shifted his attention away 
from environmental issues and focused more on diplomatic dialogue with the East and the need to 
secure domestic support for it. The newly elected US President, Jimmy Carter, was equally supportive 
of CCMS and publicly praised its work.103 1977 was also the year of the Ekofisk oilrig blow-out, when 
an estimated 126,000 barrels of oil were spilled in the North Sea. Studies published in the same period 
showed how increasing air pollution was accelerating the degrading of Europe’s most important 
monuments and cultural heritage sites, with Venice a case in point. The Ekofisk disaster and Venice’s 
degrading monuments provided NATIS with further evidence of the necessity of the work of the CCMS 
and were amply used in its information material.104  
In its early years, the CCMS played an important part in the development of treaty law.105 Taking 
advantage of the scientific, technical and organisational expertise found within the alliance, the CCMS 
became an international forum for the exchange of research ideas and new technologies on a wide-range 
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of environmental matters. The list of topics addressed by the Committee over the years was wide-
ranging and included air pollution, water pollution, spill response, hazardous waste clean-up, disaster 
preparedness, noise abatement, indoor air pollution, risk assessment, pollution prevention, pollution 
from radioactive waste stored on land and sea and the storage and dumping of chemical weapons. The 
CCMS also contributed studies to the protection the preservation of historic monuments and buildings.  
Yet, other – possibly more appropriate – forums were launched to address the legal aspects of 
wide-ranging environmental problems. The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, in 
particular, gave birth to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which became 
responsible for coordinating most of the international community’s efforts to address global 
environmental issues.106 After that, although the CCMS continued to serve as a forum for discussion 
and exchange of ideas, it was side-lined by the new body which encompassed a larger number of 
countries.  
In second half of the 1970s there were suggestions – primarily from the United States and Italy, 
and occasionally the United Kingdom – that the CCMS should address the social and institutional 
challenges facing modern society entering the post-industrial era, which would have allowed the CCMS 
to find its own niche. Yet, hardly anything came of it. The sudden increase in East–West tensions 
following the invasion of Afghanistan brought the alliance’s attention back to military defence. The 
CCMS and the environmental problem were quickly shifted to the back burner. On the occasion of the 
CCMS’s tenth anniversary, experts pointed out that  ‘the CCMS had some early, highly visible 
successes and has produced some solid work over the years, but it has begun to suffer from lack of high 
level political attention and support’.107 The CCMS continued its work until the end of the Cold War 
and beyond on a variety of projects as varied as forest fires, preservation of historical stained glass, 
aircraft noise and indoor air quality, as well as more obvious ones like environmental problems 
emanating from defence-related installations and activities.108 
It may be worth mentioning that in the post-Cold war years, the CCMS’s activities were 
expanded to include new partner countries. From 1997 it officially included the members of the new 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and of the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative (Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). The CCMS took into account the new 
strategic and security challenges with studies on the re-use of former military sites, on environmental 
education in the armed forces and on security related to the construction of new pipelines in the Black 
Sea and Caspian regions.  
In 2006 the CCMS merged with the Science Committee into the new Science for Peace and 
Security Programme, which currently includes collaboration with partner countries in Eastern Europe as 
well as Russia.109 
 
Conclusion  
If we look at the history of the CCMS as the history of NATO’s attempt to engage with the public and 
to widen its own security scope, it is clear that the new initiative – at least to a certain extent – did help 
develop a new scientific dimension to the alliance and contributed to the international debate on the 
environment. The CCMS’s work proved particularly useful in the early phases of new problem areas, 
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when issues were still vague and ill-defined. In 1971, for example, the conference of mayors held in 
Indianapolis was useful to clarify the key terms of research on the problems connected with 
urbanisation and to define common ground of interest. The pilot study on air-pollution produced 
agreement on the scientific basis and systems methodology for national air quality management 
programmes. The road safety pilot study contributed to the debate that eventually led to the introduction 
of national regulations on seat belts, inspections, auxiliary vehicle lights and alcohol tests.110 
The most obvious positive result was the intensification of the exchange of scientific and 
technical knowledge among experts, which helped strengthen the international network of skilled 
professionals and to develop new methods of collaboration. The CCMS workshops and conferences 
helped experts establish contacts and exchange ideas with minimal bureaucratic interference from either 
the alliance or national governments. According to some of the experts who took part in the CCMS 
initiatives, the great advantage was the discussion of problems and failures, which were often neglected 
in official academic conferences but were ‘extremely important to avoid waste of resources and 
time.’111  
Equally important is to point out that to a certain extent the CCMS did have the ‘gingering up’ 
effect that the British had hoped. At the time of its launch, many NATO countries had neither the 
infrastructure nor the expertise to contribute significantly to the work of the Committee. In order to 
respond to American pressure, national governments sat up new agencies and diverted funds towards 
research and training in this field. Smaller countries with fewer or no experts in some of these fields 
profited considerably from exchange of expertise.  
On the other hand, however, many of the CCMS recommendations remained on paper due to the 
lack of enthusiasm of several national governments and the costs involved. Local action was often 
delayed or reticent as national governments and regional authorities resented interference and often 
claimed that the peculiarities of their own specific situation made the CCMS’s recommendations 
irrelevant. The CCMS’s programme was indeed flexible and free from excessive bureaucratic control. 
The disadvantage was that it was also eclectic and fragmented, with no overarching purpose and no 
clearly defined raison d’être. As a result several pilot-studies ‘ended in a whimper, blessed by platitudes 
and quietly filed away’.112 Perhaps the most important pilot study in terms of building the preliminary 
basis for the concept of out-of-area and crisis management operations is the pilot study on Disaster 
Assistance carried out by the United States and Italy, which looked at the possibility of cooperation in 
the case of natural and man-made disasters and which contemplated the possibility of intervening in 
support of countries in need outside the NATO area itself.  
It is questionable, however, whether all these efforts translated into increased support for the 
alliance and how much the CCMS helped persuade the younger generations that NATO meant more 
than military defence. A cursory survey of the newspapers at the time suggests that it was the United 
Nations and the Stockholm Conference that led the environmental effort in the public’s mind. National 
newspapers hardly mentioned the CCMS, and it is difficult to see how the Committee could reach its 
target audience. In the end it remained what many thought it would be: a group of experts talking to 
experts. According to NATO’s Director of Information, the CCMS did not bring the alliance any closer 
to the public. The initial reactions were ‘not enthusiastic’ and ranged ‘from prudent scepticism to 
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outright hostility’. The younger generations, who were the primary target of the project, saw right 
through it and identified the CCMS as an attempt ‘to solicit public favour for an unpopular military 
alliance’.113 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the CCMS’s history is the tense diplomatic exchange that 
took place behind the scenes between 1969 and 1970. Within NATO any decision is a careful balancing 
act that must take into consideration a variety of national interests, priorities and concerns. The 
Permanent Representatives and their national governments keep their eyes on their countries and on 
their public and, while the reputation and the success of the alliance is officially their ultimate goal, 
their enthusiasm is often tampered by national elections, crises and problems. The state of bilateral 
relations had a similarly deep effect on the behaviour of the member states. During the Cold War 
relations with Washington were key components of the foreign policy of all NATO members, and 
national governments had to find the right balance between national goals and the health of their 
relations with the Americans. The CCMS was a case in point. At the time, no European country wanted 
to disappoint Nixon, but the American modus operandi and the timing imposed on them was frustrating 
and difficult to handle. The result was a slow and often recalcitrant response, which frustrated diplomats 
and policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic. Like so often happened in the history of NATO, it 
resulted in a compromise and as such it disappointed. Because it frustrated the Americans and seemed 
too ambitious to many Europeans, support for the CCMS faded away quickly.  
More specifically, this article also demonstrates the tense state of Anglo-American relations at 
the time and the frustration in the corridors of Whitehall. While American leadership within the alliance 
was never contested, the priorities and diplomatic ‘steam-roller’ approach caused consternation and 
resentment. The very fact that the FCO had not been consulted prior to Nixon’s announcement and that 
Britain was expected to gather European support for the American project regardless of their own 
concerns can be seen as a sign of Washington’s recalibration of its own priorities and of its support for 
the European partners. In the era of détente, West Germany was becoming a privileged interlocutor and 
Britain’s prominent role as the first point of call in Europe was under threat.  
The history of NATO has often been interpreted either as an extension of American foreign 
policy, whereby the allies more or less simply bowed to the American will in their attempt to keep the 
United States tied to Europe’s defence, or as an organisation with a will of its own, whereby ‘NATO 
decided’ to do something or the other. Yet, neither narrative is exact. In the words of a diplomat in the 
know, NATO was – and is – an ‘organised controversy’.114 
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